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IITRODUCTIOB 
!he task whichw. have eet tor 0~r •• 1v •• i. to under-
.tand the dootrlne ot exemplari .. In senera1, and, In partle-
~l.ar, thie dootrlne ae .xpoU4ed by st. Thomae Aql11naa. In thi. 
UlJdertakina we are haadloapped by .... ra.1 tacton whloh have 
arl ••• In .... 1"8 time.. ~lr.t, «*..,1&1"1 •• Is looked on ln 
the.e times .. an obscure and ooaple. polnt at .edle.al doe-
trln.. This co..,lult,.. whloh t.nds to dl.oour .... alV' •• rlotla 
ettort by the _jorlt,. of ainds, has lead to further ob.ourlt7, 
ao ~t tocl&7 there 1. a len.ral 8awar.ne ••• ven of the _-
lat.nee of-.uch a dootrine. Th.re are few c.nte.,orar.r text. 
on the .abj.ct ef _.~1 •• f aDd th.... thOl1P 1DTaluable. 
are in th .... lTe •• ummar,y. The •• modern attitud •• are the .x-
aot 1"".1" •• of tho •• which e.l.t.d In the thirt.enth ••• tur,r. 
!he dootrine of exemplar1a. 8uttered from no obaeurlty then. 
Ind.ed. It waa a baale part of the vital tradltlon whioh per-
meated the ..... Such name. a. st • .lquatlne, 1>loll1'al11., 
B.ethiua, st. An.e1JD, Peter Lombard, and st. Albert are 11ak.d 
1 
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with its developement. l Thus there were strong traditienal 
reasons why st. Thomas treated this question of exemplarism. 
However we, who are so far removed from this tradition, too 
often fail to realize the significance and importance which it 
held in the time of st. Thomas. 
And this leads us to a second difficulty prevalent in 
recent times. For the past several years much stress has been 
laid upon the existential interpretation of st. Thomas as oppos-
ed to the essential interpretation of him. It has been insist-
ed upon to such an extent that one cannot help wondering: How 
could St. Thomas have ever accepted such a thoroughly essential-
istic doctrine? One possible answer has already been indicated. 
He accepted it because he could not throw off the weight of 
tradition. However, there is a much more obvious answer which 
in this case is also the best answer. st. Thomas accepted the 
doctrine of exemplarism because it is true. And once the truth 
of exemplarism is grasped its importance in the Thomistic 
system cannot be overlooked. Therefore we must try to realize 
the truth which is contained in this doctrine of exemplarism. 
In our attempt to do this, there are three primary 
considerations which we must examine. The first is the con-
sideration of the existence and nature of the exemplary idea. 
I T.M. Sparks, O.P., ~ Divisio~ Causae Exemplaris 
Apud S. Thomam, Somerset, Ohio, 1936, 9. 
3 
such a consideration is naturally prior to any other. the 
second is the problem of the causality of the exemplary idea. 
There have been numerous interpretations of exemplary causality. 
~ own is based primarily on ~ study of st. Thomas. While he 
never treated this question formally, st. Thomas has enough 
material on it to warrant an interpretation which may be called 
Thomistic. The last consideration is of God as the model of 
all things. Here we will meet with a twofold difficulty: _ the 
possibility of God being the proper model of all things, and 
the kind of likeness existing between things and God. As a 
conclusion we will consider the position of exemplarism in re-
lation to providence and human knowledge. 
But in order to appreciate st. Thomas' doctrine more 
fully, we should give a brief historical introduction to it. 
Such an introduction, because it is brief, will necessarily be 
inadequate, and to a certain degree inaccurate. However we 
must realize that our main problem lies in the doctrine of st. 
Thomas itself, a.nd that the chief merit of an introduction is 
its brevity. 
Historically speaking the first man to hold a 
doctrine of exemplarism was Plato. In considering reality 
Plato had found that all the things he saw around him were 
constantly changing. However he also found that there were 
certain things which did not change, and these were the things 
-4 
he knew: the Ideas. For, while any white thing can be~ome 
black, whiteneRS ca~ never become blackne@~. Since these Ideas 
are eternalp immutable, and necessary, they cannot exist in 
things which are mutable, temporal, and contingent. Plato 
, 
therefore held that the Ideas were intelligible substances ex-
isting by themselves apart from all these changing things. 2 
However there is certainly a relationship between these two 
elements of reality. For these things which are constantly 
changing at least appear to be the Ideas. No two things are 
ever exactly equal, but they may at times have the appearances 
of equality. It is in this likeness to the Ideas that material, 
changing things find their highest reality. For in so far as 
they are constantly changing, they are as if they were not. But 
in so far as they imitate the Ideas which really are and never 
change, to that extent they participate in that which really 
is. 3 But let us look more closely at this relationship of the 
Ideas and their copies. 
In the Timaeus Plato tells us that the Ideas are the 
eternal models of all th.ings. These models, since they are 
eternal and unchangeable, exist above the influence of any caUse. 
2 Frederick Copleston, S.~., ~ History!! PhilosophY, 
~ol. I, Westminster Maryland, 1946, 142 - 162. 
3 ~., 163 - 206. 
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The copies, however, are temporal and changeable; and t~erefore 
they must depend upon some cause. This cause is the Demiurge, 
the supreme artist who fashions all the things in this universe 
in the likeness of the eternal models. According to Plato's 
description, the Dem1urge, looking to the models which exist in-
dependently of him, works upon a pre-existing matter which he· 
forms to the likeness of the models. 4 And this, Plato thought, 
was the ultimate origin of things. 
However there are two points of criticism which we can 
level against such a conception of exemplarism. The first is 
that ideas cannot exist apart from mind. For an idea is a men-
tal conception. It must then exist in the ~nd that conceives 
it. Thus either these Ideas are really ideas, and exist in the 
mind of the Dem1urge; or they are not ideas at all, but sep-
arate and subsisting models of all things. And it is this 
latter position which Plato seems to hold. 5 But even if we were 
to say that these models were really ideas existing in the mind 
of the Demiurge, we would be faced with a second difficulty. A 
being which is dependent upon a pre-existing matter in order to 
produce something cannot sufficiently explain the ultimate origin 
4 Plato, Timaeus, trans. B. Jowett, vol 2, New York, 
1937, 12 - 14. 
5 Etienne Gilson, !h! Spirit ~ ~diaeval Philosophy, 
New York, 1940, 154. 
6 
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of all thtna.. ,.01' at lea8t 1t oaanot explain the matter whioh 
est.t. 1I14e,ea4ent17 of It. The aotlO1l of the »emJ.ur,. 1. then 
.:u.ct17tlle .... ... the aott ••• f a all who 10 8uld.4 ~ aD ex-
ternal _4el ,. term1 .. the _terial at h1, 418,.8al.·· In p.,lt .. 
1ns thi. aotlon of bel... hlaher and. .o'bler thaD maD, plato baa 
not chaDle .. the utue ot th1. aot1 •• in the lea,t. ADd. there-
tore the Deld.uce 18 110 _r •• ble t •• qaI. the _1tl_te 01':18111 
of thln,. thaD aaD. What Plato has don. here 18 to OODf".e the 
»1",1I1e Art with hllaD art. !h1. coDtu.lol1 ... e11m1ll&ted 'b7 St. 
AU8".tlne, for he 4.D1ed the I1m1tat1oD' .t humaa art bet.re 
po.1t1Dc Art of God. IAt u.. look to st. AUlutlD •• for 1n h1 • 
•• wl11 flnd a •• .,let. ..,.the.1, of the Chr1at1aa oo.oept ot 
.x.mplar! ••• 
YOI' st. Aqut1n. th. ld.a, .ub.l,t 1n the lateUeet 
of God. 81 ... thq aft 11l God, th.Y' neo.',arl17 partIcipate In 
hi. e •• eatlal attribut... The7 are then et.rDa1. i..utabla, 
and ....... ary. AIle! beoau.e thq are ater .. 1, the,. OaDDot be 
or ... t84 t...... Bather thq an the fo .... ot all ore.te4 thill, •• 
hI" the ldea. are oenalD orl,ll1al to..... or th_ 
.tabl •. and illOo8lUllloa'ble •• I1O.»t, ot tbiBl" 
which are Dot th .... lT.. tor.-A &Dd ther.tore 
.... et.naal 8Ild exla' a1 ... .,.. In the .... way, &a4 
whioh an o •• talae .. 1. tM 41T1ae latol11 •• a ••• 8 
" • ooete~nal with God, and t~r.tore ••• entlally the .aae •• God, 
the lde •• tben are the Word ot God. The Word. the Second Per.on 
of the Ble •• ed Trlnlt7. 1. the expres.ion of God 1n all that He 
1. and can 40. And therefore lt 1s accordlng to H1a Word that 
He makes all thtna.. But 1n so tar as all thin,. are acoordinl 
to the Yard. the7 wl11 re.emble the Word which 1a God. There-
tore to be made b7 God and to re.eable God are on. and the .ame 
thlnl_" But let U oon81der what 1t meana to be _de by God. 
A thiq whi.h i. _4e by God 1. cr •• ted. And this 
concept of oreation 1. oerta1n17 41ft.rent tram P1a,to-s des-
cription ot the feration of thine. by the Dem1,ar,e. :lor out ... 
• 1de of God ther, waa nothina. not. eTen the raw material out of 
which He could taBbloD thlacs. Hence lt God 11 to make a~­
tMOI. He •• t make lt entlrely. that i. oreate 1t. There la 
noth1na then ln the etteot whloh 40e. not ow. lts ~i.tence to 
God. Theretore both .. tter and the forme whioh .. ~ter a •• umes 
haTe been oreat.d 'by God. And .1no. God ha. cir&1fl1 all thili,S in-
to belna from noth1Q1D.... He 40e. 1n Hi. diviDe ,o04.e.. .ulde 
the. to thelr proper end. 1'01' to oreate 1. to sen'erll. There-
Pelis' traaalatlon aa oonta1ned in the Bandom Hou.e edition of 
the laai9 \Yri tiM! !.t h1g1i !h,._ ,guina!. . 
7 Charle_ .Boyer. S.3 •• L'14'e U vlrit' dUl! 1:1 
Philosolbi. l! §aint '!lu,tl;. Pari •• 1920, 119, 123. 
.8 
tore the God Who .~ates 1e aleo a provident God.8 
Thie tUDaa..ntal~ 1s the position whioh all Chris· 
tiae phil.eophere hold with re.ard to the doctrine ot exemplar-
ie.. BUt 1t 1e our taek to consider the intricaci.s of this 
doctrine as propos.d b7 st. Tho ... Aquinas. Therefore let us 
look to st. Tho.... treat .. nt ot exemplar1s •• 
8·D14 •• 132 - 18t, 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF THE EXE:MPLAR 
Creation was for st. Thoma~ as for any Christian 
philosopher, the production of something from nothing. Of 
course "nothing" does not signify the matter out of which some-
thing·is made, but is only meant to convey that the thing pro-
duced was not made from anything. It is a denial of any mater-
ial cause. But the thing which is of interest here is that 
creation is a production, an action which results in some pro-
duct. And action can be of two kinds: either necessary or 
free, i.e, voluntary. However into which class does creation 
fall? Is it necessary or voluntary action? 
In his analysis of action st. Thomas finds that every 
action tends· towards some definite end. But since action 
follows upon the nature of the agent, both action and end will 
depend upon the specific nature of the agent. Upon an examin-
ation of agents we observe that action proceeds from them 
either according to the freedom of their will or according to 
the necessity of their nature. Thus in the latter case the sun 
will rise every morning, to state this astronomical occurance 
naively. But on the other hand a man need not rise in the 
9 
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morning, or even in the afternoon for that matter. He ~ll 
arise only when he so chooses. 
It is evident that will and nature act in differnt 
ways. For nature does not know either the end or the means to 
the end, and therefore it can neither set an end for itself nor 
direct and order itself to the end. The voluntary agent however 
knows all that is denied to the natural agent. And therefore he 
can determine an end for himself, and direct himself to that end 
by ordering his actions to it. 
Nature indeed tends to an end as moved and directed 
by another being who possesses understanding and will. 
And this is clear from the example of the arrow, which 
tends to a determinate mark on account of the direction 
of the archer, and in this way it is said by the phil-
oaophers, that the work of nature is a work of intel-
ligence. l 
This reduction of the "work of nature" to "the work of intelli-
gence" is of great importance. For understanding is the necess-
ary condition of volition. If we did not know that there were 
several possibilities of action, we could not be said to choose. 
Choice presupposes the selection of one from several. Since a 
free will is the only appetitive faculty which is proportionate 
to the intellect, in placing intelligence at the summit of all 
"works", st. Thomas holds that the first of all actions is vol-
I De Pot., q.3, a.15, Quaestiones Disputatae, Marietti 
ed., vol. 2,~ome, 1949, 231: ThIs is highly reminiscent of the 
fifth proof for the existence of God; ct. S.T., I, q.2, a.3. 
11 
untary. • 
st. Thomas goes on to say that God is intelligence. 
and therefore all the things which He is able to accomplish 
will pre-exist in Him in an intelligible mode. For the effect 
pre-exists in its cause according to the manner of cause. Thus 
whatever is produced by God is brought into existence by His 
free choice, i.e., by the voluntary action of God. 2 
The important thing is hereby established: that God 
acts not by the necessity of His nature but according to His 
intelligence and His will. Therefore the action which God per-
forms in creation is voluntary and not necessary action. Hav-
ing settled this issue we may inquire as to whether God is the 
exemplary cause of all things. And St. Thomas tells most 
assuredly that He is. 
If for the production of anything an exemplar is nec-
essary it is in order that the effect may receive a 
determinate form. For an artificer produces a deter-
minate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before 
him ••• Now it is manifest that things made by nature 
receive determinate forms. This determination of forms 
must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first prin-
ciple ••• And therefore we must say that in the divine 
wisdom are the models of all things, which we have call-
ed ideas - i.e. exemplary forms existing in the divine 
mind.3 
2 Ibig,. 
3 S.T. q.44, a.3, Basic Writings of §1. Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 1, New York, 1945, 430. 
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Here we find that God is likened to the artist 
(artifex); and it will be to our advantage if we consider more 
closely this likeness to the artifex.4 The distinction, as in 
the example of the archer and the arrow, is again based upon 
the intelligence of the agent. The artificer or artist produces 
things according to his intelligence and will. But why is the 
exemplar a necessary condition of his action? We need only ex-
amine the nature of the exemplar to find the answer., The ex-
emplar is the form of the thing to be produced as it is precon-
ceived in the mind of the artist. The intelligent agent pro-
ceeds only according to his knowledge. Therefore he must be 
able in some way to know what is to be produced before he pro-
duces it. If this condition were not fulfilled there could be 
no artist. It is the exemplar which fulfills this condition. 
And therefore the exemplar must be considered as a necessary 
element in artistic production. Consequently the exemplar is 
necessary for all intelligent production. 
We may be assured that creation is an intelligent 
production. And since creation is an activity proper only to 
God, He must be an intelligent producer or a.rtist. It was for 
this reason that many mediaeval writers referred to creation 
as the Divine Art. And rightly so. For this is the greatest 
4 cf. Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, trans. 
F.J. Scanlan, London, 1930. This rs-t~most complete modern 
analysis of art and the artist. 
13 
work of intelligence ever produced. • But since this is so, there 
must be in God, as artist, the ideas or exemplars according to 
which He produces His effects. Therefore st. Thomas in consid-
ering God takes up the question De Ideis. 
St. Thomas says the effect to be produced must pre-
exist in the agent, and this may happen in either of two ways.5 
First, the form of the effect may pre-exist in its natural being, 
as fire generates a fire. And this, as we have seen, is action 
by the necessity of nature. Second, the form of the effect may 
pre-exist in its intelligible being, as the likeness of a build-
ing pre-exists in the mind of the architect. And this is action 
by intellect. But since this is the manner of action by which 
God creates, the forms to the likeness of which He produces 
things must exist in His divine mind. And this 1s the notion 
of the idea. 
Therefore this seems to be the concept of idea, that 
idea is the form which something imitates according to 
the intention of an agent who determines the end f6r 
himself .6 
The idea is therefore a form. However it is not the 
intrinsic form which, dwelling in the composite, determines the 
being to its particular nature and constitutes it in a definite 
grade of being. It is rather an extrinsic form, a form which 
5 ~.T., I, q. 15, a.l. 
6 De Ver., q.3, a.l, iuaestiones Disputatae Marietti 
ed., vol~,l, Rome -;-i949 , 63. 
14 
exists apart from the thing itself. • And this is the common ac-
ceptation of idea. For the idea of man is not the form of man 
in so far as this form constitutes any particular composite, but 
it is the form of man as it exists a~art from all men in the 
mind of the knower. However the idea is not merely the extrin-
sic form, but it is the extrinsic form "which something imitates 
according to the intention of an agent who determines the end 
for himself." There is therefore a likeness which exists be-
tween the idea and the thing which is produced. And this like-
ness is intended by an intelligent agent. Thus the definition 
of idea containes three principal elements: idea is (1) an ex-
trinsic form, (2) to the likeness of which something is con-
stituted, (3) by the intention of a free and intelligent agent. 
This however seems to present a problem. For God has 
not only a practical knowledge but also a speculative knowledge. 
But ideas taken strictly in the sense of exemplars insure God 
only a practical knowledge of all. His effects and in no way in-
dicate that He has any speculative knowledge. This would be a 
very grave limitation of the term ideas. For ideas are commonly 
considered not merely to be principle of operation in the sense 
of exemplars, but they are also held to be principle of know-
ledge.? st. Thomas was certainly not unaware of this problem, 
? "By the term ideas we understand the forms of things 
existing outside of things themselves, that is to say, whose ex-
istence is extrinsic to things, and these we call ideas or forms. 
]..e 
tor he aaka, -y!lll I! Jf!ctloya !!! !J!Ollatl." 001'1"1 •••• 
!J.ct •• t lp8.. ~e,,·8 
Speeula"I.. aDd practical knowledae differ acoording 
to their r •• ,..tl.o eDds. !he aDd of apeculatl •• kDowled.e i. 
truth a'b •• ,latelY couldereel. while the •• 4 8f pr •• tlcal bow-
ledge la operatlon. %hua kDowle48e 1. oal1e4 practloal b7 Ita 
re1&t10. to a._ work (y !dl!!! ti D!!I.). .... then are two 
re1&t1088 which Call utat 'be •••• kIIo"ladae an4 work. Dow-
ledle oan be actual1.7 ordere4 to work. aa when· the artlat pro-
.ee4e to reall.e the procoacel •• 4 torm of hla work ot art. filia 
la actual praotlcal Jmcnrledae. !here 1a aleo bowled.e whlch 
la capable of beins orelered to work but la not aot_l17 a. 
ordered, .. a when an artlat preooaoel •• e a work of art but doea 
Dot llltead to prodl.lC. It. !hls 1. habltll8.1 or .1%'tual praotical 
lalowle4... How .. er .peou1at1 •• lmowleqe 1. DeTer ordered to. 
operat10D. 80met1._ th1a 1e becau.e the thlD8 taowa cl •• a not 
11e within the power of the ]mowe!', aa wheD ... __ .a nat.ral 
or 41.1n8 thiqa. 80_1;1 ... howe •• r the thl128 JmOWll 1. operable 
" 
However, tbe t.~ .t a ~1Ds.sl.tl .. out.lde $I. l, •• lt OaD be 
o" .. e4 1. two _qe. .1 ther •• 1 t la the e:&eap1&1" .f t:he thiDa 
t. the lik ••••• 01' whloh the thlq 1t •• lt 1 •••• atltute4, or aa 
1" '8 _. priDoi»l. .f the __ 184.. of the tIliq ill .. tar &a 
the f.~ or 1 •••• f the thtaa kDOWa , ••• 14 ,. be in the kaower.-
noaa lIaria Zlslla.n.. fI!!!!r!I alle.,Hit •• ,.48. a.l, yol.2, 
Paria, lS91. &01. 
· ' 8 Df Ier. J q.3. a.3 J .t. ! . .!_., If q.1'. a.16. 
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b1 the knower but 1t 1. not con.1dere4 &8 operable. ADd thus 
the intelleot consider. .eparatelY that whlcb ia not .eparate 1n 
the thins It.elt. :for an arcbitect ..,. conelder a baild1n, w1th 
r.s,eot to 1ts ,enu. aDd 41fferenc.a. Thia would be speculative 
knowledae. 
Bo. G04'. Xnowled.e 1. the cause of thingse Therefore 
He .111 oontaln 'both maDDera of ,raot10&1 lmowledge. Be ."at 
knOW thoae thinaa whloh He haa _de or wl1l -ke, and alao thoae 
thlD1a wblch He 1. able to make but ne ... er w111 make. J'Urther-
more God haa 8peoulatlve knewled,e. 101" He knewa Himself and 
Ue 1. not able to be made 1n any _...,. "ree",er all other things 
oan be cons1dered not oalY praoticallY but also speoulatively. 
Altd .e cannot deny tMs perfection of a Ged Who i. Pertection. 
And thua 1t 11 that st. Thomas recogniz •• a certain 
... b181.11 ty 1n the word !dea. For 1 t not only implies the form b7 
which somethlng i8 made but a180 the CODcept or likene.. of 'the 
thiq lmowa. 
'lheretore 1t we apeak of the ldea aeeerding to the 
proper oODoept of the n .... thus 1t extends only to 
that ec1enoe accord1na to whlch eometh1q 1. tormed, 
aad thi. 18 either actual praotical knowled.e. or 
onlY Tlrtual practical knowledge, whlch 1n a .ertain 
wa:y 18 .,e.ulatlTe. :sut it we reter to the idea as 
1. cOJlllGnly uBed to mean 11lten •• s or ooncept. thus 
1de. can pertain purely to epeoQlative kDowled,e.9 
EaTina 41ep"ed of the shackles of te~nol.lY. let 
9 na. 
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U8 consider whether there are many ide.8.10 And it appears 
that there are, for there are ma~ thinss which God has created. 
Since God baa created many thing., He has properly intended to 
constitute them in existence. But He could not properly intend 
to make each ot them unle.s there were present in His mind the 
idea. or exemplars accordin, to which each of them 1. made. 
Whence it is necessar,y to 8~, that the ,complete dis-
tinction of things 1. pre-defined b.Y Him. And there-
fore it ls necessary to hold ln God the proper con-
cepts ot sinsular thlnss, and thus ma~ 1deas. ll 
But can God have the ide. of all things known b:y Him"' 
Idea in It. primary .ense, we must remember, refers to the ex-
emplar according to which the arti8t produces the effect. But 
since God i& in no way the cause of evil, it i. apparent that 
God cannot have the idea of evll In thl& sense. However there 
is a secondary meanin. of ldea in .0 far a. it reters to the 
ooncept or &i~litud. a. a prlnclple of knowledge. But there 
can be no ldea of .vil ln this 8en.e either, because evll lacks 
a tor.m. For evll ls a denlal ot ,ood and therefore at belnc. 
ADd slnoe &lmilitude 1. a 11kene.& with respeot to form, evll, 
lacking torm, can have DO ldea in God.12 
10 i.I., I, q.15, &.2. 
11 ~. !!I., q.3, a.2. 
12 ~., &.3, a.4. 
tect17. , 
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HOwever G04.40e. know evll. For God know. aooa per-
Whoe.,..r kne •• a thina perfectly ... t leDow all that 
can eccur to 1t. No. there are aome lood thiDa. to 
which oorruptlon by ev1l .., occur. Hence God would 
Dot know .ood thlna. perfeotlY,unl ••• He al.o know 
evll thi.... Jlo. a thias 1. kr»wable in the delrea 
1n which 1t 1 •• henoe, .• 1DCe th1. 1. the •••• nc. of 
e.,.l1, that 1t 1. the prl't'atlon of good, by the very 
taot that God kIlow. ,ood thing., He aleo Dowe a ... il 
thia,.,ae by liptdarlmea. 1s kno ... l~ 
Bor i. thls an impert.ctloR ln God t. bowled._ that He mows 
.vll on17 as a prlvation of ,ood. For,1L. lt 1e brouaht out 1n 
thie arti01e, a thi .. OaD be kncnrn only in eo tar a. it 1.. But 
evll haa no other esietence escept a. a prlTation ot good. And 
theretore it 1. only i8 thie way that aT11 1a knowabl •• 
:aut oan there b. an idea ot prime matter? Not ln so 
tar as 14ea sianltle. the exemplar. For the exemplar regard. a 
thing a.cordiac aa lt 1. oapable 01' production. But .1nce mat-
ter cannot be produced wlthout ao_ tor., there must be a a1nsle 
exemplar ot the Whole oomposite. tor thls alone 1. what ls pro-
duced.Theretore there can be DO eumpla..,. idea ot prlme _tter .. 
But lt .e take the ide. a. a princlple ot kno.ledge. there can 
be &Dldea of prlme _tter. For ln this .en.e there are dlstinct 
ldea. of thoa. thiDls whioh can be couldered dlstlnotly e ... en 
thou,h the.e thia18 oannot exl.t .eparately. And theretore there 
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can be an lde .. of pr1me .tter in this •• nae. l ' • 
BOw oan i~ be po •• ible thollah to haYe any knowledae of 
prime matter? For.e can on~ know a thiD, 1n '0 far aa it ii. 
Howe.er pr1mematter in it •• lf i. not. It 1. true prime matter 
in It.elf i. Dot, and therefore we cannot, .trictl,. .peaking, 
know 1t ln lt8elf. But .. en thouCh prime :ma~ter doe. not actu-
allY exl.t, it 1. that whlch ie related to exi.tenc. In so far 
.a 1t l.tha~ which la capable ot exl.tence. And it ls thla re-
latlon to exi.tenc. which we are able .k knew. 
Althoup pl'l. ma~ter 1. untoJ"med, :ret there 1. ln it 
an imitation of the firet torm. for how ••••• r much 1t 
haa lneutflcl.nt bein, (debila e •• e :seat), .tl11 i,t 
1. aD lmitation of the firaiii.inK'; a in thl. wa7 it 
can ha •• a 11keneae to God.lfS 
_ow 1.t ua coa.id.r the ldea of the po •• lble.. The 
exemplar:.r ldea, we mut re .. mber,oontldera both actual and Ylr-
tual practical kDowledce. God haa .1rtual practical knowledge 
concerni .. all thiqa which He oan make but neYer has or e.er 
wlll make. Therefore He haa the ideas of all pO.81ble th1DS •• 
]'01' the 1de.s o't ao1;\18.1 thin,., ln ao far .1 the,. are po4uced 
or ordered to production, are determined b7 a degree of the . 
dlYin. wl1l. Thue lt i. d.eteraned that a thia. i. here, and 
now, ln thia w&F. But the ldeal of thoae thinse which neither 
14 ~ Ver., q.3, a.~. 
15 Ibi!., q.!, a.5, ad.l. 
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• are nor __ b.en, Dor will be have no such determination. 
Therefore they are oalle4 undetermined ideas.16 
'.ADd laatly we'ust inqaire whether God has idea. of 
slngular thines. ADd. it oan be 81unrered very 81.,17 that He 
must have the ·lde.s of 81nC'llar thinga, fo·r this 16 precisely 
what He oreated. It w0\114 be fool1sh, however, to deny to the 
artist the knewled.e of that which he principallY intended. 
81noe God is the cause of thin •• by Hia, kDOIt'ledge, 
.e was stated above, Hie knowledge extenda aa tar as 
m. oaus .. l1 t1' esteads. Hence, as ,the act,iv. power 
of God extende not only to forma. whioh are the 
sOUJ'o. of \lDivereality, but a1eo to matter [which 
is the.ouree ot e1qulal"lt7J ••• the ]mowled.e of 
God muet .xtend to ain811lartbinge, which are indi-
viduated by matter. 1' 
16 Ibid. ,q.3,. a.61, ,cf. Etienne Gillon, l!!!. Philoeo-
~ ot st. ~onaveDture, trana. Dom 111t7d Trethowan and 7.1. 
Shier; r." York, 1938, 159., 




HavlD1 .een St. Thomas' treatment of the traditional 
queat,I'" I!l 14.1., it remain. tor us to determ.1ne the preci.e 
nature of exemplary causallt,.. !he exe.,la17 idea, as .. e have 
.een, ls that ~ meane of whloh an intel11gent agent produoes a 
.. '" 
determinate effect. Ia thls statement we .ee that there ls some 
kind of causality implied by the ldea. We should also remember 
that the 14e. lD It. pr1mar.Y and proper· .enae of exemplar al .. a~s 
hal the nature of praetto.1 bew1,d.,. However practical know. 
ledge ls a1..,s %elated to work. and therefore lt 1. alw~. re-
lateel to the conoept of oaueallt,y. There ia no way of .eoapina 
the oaueality of the «kemplara. But once we a.k ourselve. what 
type of causality the exemplar exerts, we are fa.ed .i~a tre-
mendous proble.. However, I believe our 801ution lie. in st. 
Thomae t thatment of exemplary cauaality. if we have but the 
patience to aee him through. x.t ua .tart then at the baal. of 
thia proble •• 
fte exemplar 1. aD idea, and thia exemplary idea ia in 
aome way oauae. ~or.the artiat accompli.he. hi. work acoording 
to and by ·uane of the exemplar 1n hi. Iliad. ADd theretore, &8 
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at Thomas says, the exemplar mu8t be a principle o'f aotlon.1 
However an ldea i8 not a principle ot actlon in 80 far as it re-
.1d •• ln the lnte11ect of the lnower unless it reoe1ves an In-
ollnation to an eftect. And such an lnolination can only be re. 
ceived from the act10n of the will. 
For .1nce the 1ntell181ble form haa a relation to COD-
trarie. (inasmuch as the same kaowledae relates to 
contraries). -It woald not produoe a determinate efteot 
unles. lt were determined to one thin, b7 the appetite, 
as the Philosopher 8~8.2 ' 
Theretore an idea is inaotive outside of a union with the wl11. 
Before the ldea 18 united to the will, st. Thomss would oall 1t 
lU\ tmdeterm1ned ldea, even though 1 t 1. Clapable ot producia. an 
etteot. It lIluet be wd ted to the wll1 ln order the. t 1 ta oapaol ty 
tor actl ... 11;y may be &ot118.11.e4. Therefore ainee an idea oannot 
be a caus. without the lnfluenoe ot the wl11, we must oonsider 
the relationship which exlsts between the latell.ot and the wl11. 
The -tll is an lnd1.peD.able ele.ent ln a con.lderatlon 
of exem»lar,y oausall t,.. For no _tter how well an art 1. lm01m, 
.. e never make ..,thing unle •• 'We are moved to do lt by the wl11. 
And this 1. beoau.e the object of the wl11 1. the end and the 
1 "Now the knowled,e of the artifioer i. the oatt.e ot 
the thlne. made by hi. art from the tact that the artlficer 
works throup hl. intelleot. Henoe the torm in the lntelle.t 
muat be the prlnclple of actionl a& heat i8 the princlple of 
he.tine." 1.1., I. q.14, a.8. 
2~.J of. Aristotle, .. ta~.t IX, 5, (1048a 11), 
Dt. ~ York. !! Arlstotle, R1o&rd McKeon 84., Ne ... York, 
~~. . 
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,ood. For aince the objeot of the will 1s the good, which baa 
the nature or end, the wlll moves the other powers of the eoul 
to aot; and .. e make use of theee powera when we 80 wll1. 
For the enda and pertectlons of every other power are 
lncluded under the object of the w11l ae partlcular 
gOOd8, and the art or power, to whioh the universal 
end belong., [isoil. the wil1J alw81'8 moTe. to their 
acts the. ute or powers to whlch be1on, the particu-
lar _d. inoluded in the universal end.! 
However the wl11 cannot act for an en4 unless the end 
1. known. But to knGW 18 the funotion of the intellect. The 
will then 18 lncomplete wlthout ita oomplementary faculty, the 
lntelleot, just a. the lntellect i. inoomplete without the wl11. 
Thu. the intellect apart from the w111 would be sterile ln the 
order of aotioR, Whlle tbe w111 apart from the intellect would 
laok dlreot10n ln action. For ... e not onlY aot or retra1n trom 
actlns. but we aot 1n thls way or 1n that. The w111 look. to 
the lXerol!! or use of the act, whereas the lntellect looks to 
the det!rmin,t1y of the act.' And ln thi. way the lntelleot 1. 
said to move the w11l. 
on the other baud, the objeot JIlOTes by determ1nins 
the"aot. atter the manner of a formal pr1nclple, 
whereb7 In aatural thiaaa actlon. are .,.olfled, •• 
he.tina by beat. No ... the flrst tormal prineiple 1. 
uniTereal belli and truth, which le the objeot of 
the intelleot. And th.retore by thie kind of mfttioD 
the intelleot moTes the will, aa »reeentiDs it. 
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object to It. 5 
perhaps DOW .. e can reali.e why it 18 80 difflcult to treat either 
of the •• taculties .eparately 1n the order of action. In this 
.ay they appear as phantOMS alw.,s quavering beneath our gaze, 
tor nelther o~ the. coataln. in Itselt the sufticient reason tor 
the result .tfected by thelr interaction. Iotellilent aetion i. 
posslble OD~ by the union of the will and the intellect, and to 
disregard either one Is to d.stroy the Inte,rity of that aotion. 
In this way the •••• ntially ~ed character of every 
intellia.nt action becomes apparent. And will and intellect are 
the factor. whioh mutually condition thls aot1on. For 1n all 
our reasoned acta there must be an act of the will, slnce the 
wlll mo ..... our facultles to thelr resp.cti .... operations. Thus 
I will ~o .at, to run, to t.el, to know, I .... en will to will. 
Th. op.rations of all the other faculties dep.nd upon the aot of 
the wll1. It 1. the will that either mOTes them to act or k.ep. 
them trom actina. y.t the wl11 ot it.elt oan neTer det.rmine the 
nature ot the aot. It 1s itself bllnd and OaD only act upon that 
whioh the r ..... n presente to It as aood. 
It ,. the wl11 that caus •• me to will, but it i. the 
Int.llect that caua •• ., .111 to wl11 What I wlll; 
and in ~hi. ..DS • ., intelleot act. upon ~ wl1l as 
~ wll1 acts on ~ lntellect.6 
& Ibid. 
6 ~tl.nn. GilsOD, !lral y~lue. aDd ~.~ 11f., 
trane. Le~ Richard Ward, O.S.O., st. Loul., 193I,-ea:-
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• Now that we have oonsidered the relationship between 
the intellect and will. we are ab'.to aee the intricaoie. ot 
exemplary causality. The exemplar 1.fir'st of all a finaloaus •• 
It i8 an ide. Which is »reeented to the will as a good or an end 
to be aoulht. This may eaailybe a.en if W. oonsider the ways 
in which the tour cau8e., 8eil. efficient, material, forma1~ and 
tinal. are prior to their eftects. The &lent and the matter 
precede the effect accordinc to intrinsic beinl. The end how-
ever preoede. it accordina to int.ntion~and not accordins to b .... in,. And the torm 1s prior to the effect in neither of the •• 
two ways in eo tar as it i8 a torm. For the bein, both ot the 
ettect 8114 'its tormare .imu1taneou8.? 
HOWever in so tar a. the torm 1. an end, it preced •• 
the ettect in the intention of the agent. And a1-
thoulh the torm is the 'end of operation, being the 
end that terminate. the operation ot the .. ent, still 
every end 1e not a torm. For besides the end of op-
eration there i. an end ot intention, ae in the cas. 
ot .. hou.e.! 
Uaing st. Tho.s' example "e can .ee clearly that the 
foraot the hou.e i. the end ot operatiaa. For it was thia'torm 
that the builder strove to reali.e, and haviDg reali •• d it he 
haa attaiaed the end ot his operation. But while hi. operation 
oeae.a at the realisation ot the tor.m, hi. intention i8 not ter-
miuated here. Rather hie intention looke toa turther end. For 
? R! !!l., q.3, •• 16. 
8 Ibid. 
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• he intend. to 11ve 1n the house himself, or allow some one e1.e 
to live there. ADd· thi. ia the end of intention. 
This torm which ia the end of opernti on preoede. the 
ettect in the intention of the agent. From our preTioue consid-
eration of t~a matter. we know that thi. form i. identical with 
the exelDJ)lary ide.. And 8ince this form i8 a.n end to be a.ttain-
ed, the exempla.ry idea will neoessari1y exereiae final causalit,.. 
Final causality 18 thet1rst of a.l1 cause8. For the beglnDlnl of 
any action 1. the end, 8ince the end i~that which is flrst 
ao\1Sht. However, one might object, .... :fol'm whlch ls the eDd 
of operation 18 not aD ultimate end but on~ a proximate end. 
BUt thl. i8 Dot: .• real difficulty. For the fact tha.t this Is a 
proxlmat •• nd merelY chani.a lt8 aequence a8 an end, but in no 
way d •• tro7l1t. nature of end • 
.But let u. looktu..,ther at this artio1e. Here we find 
st. Thoma. app171n, thi. ooncept ot exemplary oau8allty to God. 
". know that the ,....:.r of God 1. lJ1t1nite, and theretore He can 
create aD7thiq _lch oan :p0.81b17 be. KoreoTer He Is lntell1-
gent, and w.l11 hence act aocoJ'din8 to the 14e.s He has. How ..... r 
the eDd GOd t • intention 1. the divine goo4n.... And therefore 
God 18 Dot nGoe •• ltatedtocr.ate any certain thins rather than 
another beoatl88 of the end ot Hi. intention" tor the di'1'll'1e 
10041'1.'. ,ain. Dothing trom the production ot the ettect •• 
Therefore God 1. absolu.te1y . tree 11'1 m. choice of the idea. 
whioh Be w111 reali... But when He hal Chosen to reali.. a 
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oertaln 14e.,' thi. ldea lmpo ••• nec ••• lty ... to what wl11 be 
proel_.e4. 
Theretore lt re .. lne that th.re au .. no nece •• lty 
ln the dlT1D. worb wsle •• troll1 the torm, whlch 1. 
the aDd .f .peratlon. For thl. torm, alnee lt 1. 
not lnflnlt., bas ,.t.radDed princlple. wlthout which 
1t 1. not able to be.' 
ThU.. it we .tlppos. that God Intend. t. or. ate DaD, He .... t ore-
at. • l'atlo_1 80ul aIl4 an oqaDlc 'boA,.. For wi thout the.. there 
oan be DO.... ADd 1t God lat. ad. to create a oertalD qalTera •• 
Be will haTe toore.t. the.. oreature. wti£oh are part. .t that 
unl.el'... ]JUt .1.0. God aot. in thi_ w..,. acoor41q to n. la-
te11e.t. 8t. !ho ..... nelad •• that the dlYeratty of oreat~e8 1. 
a .ark of the 41Tia •• 184.111.10 
Thu.. we OaD .e. how the exe..,ar' a oauaal1ty 40 •• not 
atop at 'be1q .... 17 t1na1. bat 1t1'00e.4. to take on the role ot 
foral ca .. a. hr, ... e haTe •••• In our ... lysl. ot the rela-
tl •• ot lnte11 •• t aad .111. "the obJ •• t moTee by d.ter1l1nins the 
aot, attel' the aannel' ot a fOI' .. 1 prlaclp1 •• • !h. 14ea pl' ••• nt-
.d to the .111 ... pod b.eo ... the tor..1 oau.a. of the aot ot the 
will when the 14ea 18 qal t.d to the .111. For the 14.. 4.termn. 
, Ibid. 
10 "S10 ll1tu%' 410.84a •• t, CI.od ab uno prll110 mu1tltudo 
.t 41T.r.lta. ol'eatUJ'arua pr ••••• lt. nOD propt.r materia. nec· 
e •• ltatell, D •• propter pttentla. l1Ja1tatioaell, ne. propter 'boni-
tate., ••• propter bonltatl. ob 11eat 1 on •• , •• 4 ex ordla. aapl. 
entiae, ~t 1n 41Ter.ltate or.aturarum pel't •• tlo oonalatel'e' 
unlTerai.- II Zll., q.~, a.16. 
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the nature ot the aot ot the will. Thus when the i4ea ot man ia 
united to the will 1t determin •• what 1. to be made to rational 
.ow It 1. 8TldoDt that, In a .en •• , reason preced •• 
the will &DC1 41reot. it. act, -17 1n eo tar as the 
wl11t8Dde to 1t. object .coord1ns to the order of 
rea.onl tor the .pprehe.siTe , .. er pre.ente to t~o 
appetite 1ta, objeot. Acco!'d1nsly, the act where'y 
the wl11 teDds to .cmethina propoaed to It .s belng 
ao04, throu,h bel ... rd.1D~ to the end b,. thereaeon, 
1. _terlal1,. aD aot ot the will, but tormally an aot 
of the reaa.n. 11 
The exemplary idea exert. a fOrmal causallty, becau.e 
1 t latora the wl11 and determine. the aot ot the wl11 to .ome 
one thiq. Beaiele. the tinal and tcr.l oau8.11ty whlch it aJ:-
ert •• tbe exemplary Ide. a18. exercl.ea ettlclent oau8.11ty. 
701" it aoti.811' ordera and 41reot. tha wl11 In Ita operation. 
!ha wl11 ot It •• lf 1. bllnd, and theretore It oan on17 reoolTo 
dlrectlon aD4 order tJ'OJl &0" external .ouroa. '1'h1a external 
aource 1. the ,exemplary ldea. Theretore the ldea whlch 1. In 
»oteooo to the produotlon of an attect 1. not In paa.i"e potenca, 
but It 1. In actt •• potenoe. ll ADd In 80 tar a. the 14e. ettect 
an order, to that ext.nt It 1. actt •• and efticleat. Howe.er 
11 8 I t., Ia II.e, q.13, a.l. 
12 ·Slcut formae artltloial.a babe.t duplex •••• , 
UDum in aotu .ecundum quod aunt 1n materia, a11ud Inpotentla 
seoundum quod .unt 1n meat. artiflcia, noa qaid •• 'ln potentia 
pa.sl",a, sed acttva, Ita ettam forma. materla.1es habent dU1?lex 
•••• , ••• un .. in aotu •• cund.- quod In rebus aunt, et a1104 1n 
potentia acti"a .ecundum quod 8unt ••• 1n deo ••• tt Ideo forma. 
reJ'WI In Deo e .. lataate. 14eas dlolmu •• quae suatalout for_. 
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order 18 potential and imperfect unless it is imposed apon that 
which!. to be ordered. Theretore the erticlent causality of 
tbe exemplary idea attains its completlon and per~eet1on only 
when the order and direction caused by the exemplary 14ea is i~ 
poeed upon the act of the will. 
the eftiel.At oaoaallty of the exemplar ldea then, 18 
partlal and when coneidered 1n actu {r11l0 consiete In 
the ttdlrlpaattt nrtu.e that n 8u»1 .a to a wl1l, 
otunle. b11.D4. 1& .Yi!!1!tydrh Its causality Is 
the actual d1r •• tlon that the .ill-ln-action baa where-
by tbe effeot. 1-,tatt ••• f the idea, t. produced. l ! 
.,.-' 
How thl. ie ,1"e01.e17 the polllt. The etficient cau.s-
&l.lty: of the ."JQlal"ie pantalout.ide of its relation to the 
will, 3uet aa ita flDal and for .. 1 causality are partial outside 
ot ~ ..... r.la~l.D8hlp. HOweYer it. relation to the will 1a a 
complex ODe, aDd 1t .e Aiarecard &87 element ot thl. oomplex re-
lat1888hlp, •• dest~o7 the oonti •• ity ot aotion. !he oauaallt7 
ot the exemplar baa a three.tolA relationship to the will depend. 
1ns "lOll the pre.lae .. _nt lathe ... ell,ent of the will. :l'lrat 
the exellJkr 1. a t18al C&"' •• in ao tar aa It Is the end, then 
1t 1. a formal eau.e 1n 80 tar aa It deterDdnes the nature ot 
the act; and t1nally 1 t 18 all .,f101.nt cau8e In 8. tar &8 1 t 
dlreot. the act. But.e ••• that none ot theae are complete 1n 
operatlvae." Sent., Lib. I. d1s. 36, q.2, a.l, !Crll tum SupeE lA_roa ge.tiH!!llt lIanAonnet a4 •• Tol. 1, Par 1 a , 929, :542. 
13 ~an01a "ehan, ,ttlcle.t 0&" .. 11t7 1. jll.totle !!! n. Do ... Oath.81ic tJR'Ter.1~" Of AMrlcaa PhilosophIcal stu(l1 •• , 
T.l. 66, " ... 1nst.a. D.p., 1940, 181. 
themselve.. Tak.n .eparately' nOlle oontaina the euttioi.n'\ rea.oll 
{or the complete act. All the.e element. are e •• ential and in-
di.pensable to exemplar.r cau.ality. Thi. i. w~. taken .eparate-
lY, no one of the.. oharacteri.e. exemplary oauaa11 ty any more 
thaD another. It 1. only' throup vinlng this aotion •• a whole 
that we can I~ that lt 1 .... t properly' one type of causality or 
another. Therefore let u •• e. what st. Thoma. conaider.d a. the 
charaoteri.tic8 o~ thi. aotion •• a whole. 
What .tand. out mo.t vividly in st. Thoma.' treatment 
of the exemplar i. that it is an extrinsic torm which determine. 
the likene •• of the etfeot to ita.1t. And th.refore the causa1-
lty of the exemplar wll1 hay. to inolud. th ••• two a.p.cta ot 
ext.riority and llk.n •••• 
••• thie word ide! ••• me to signify a torm .eparated 
from that of which it 1. a torm. Finally the form of 
a thlng i. 8ald to b. that att.r which (!! 9,uod) 80me-
thi.. i. f01'lll8d J and thie i. the exemplary form, to 
the 1.ken •• 8 of which 8om.thing is oon.titut.d. And 
the word id.a 1. commonly u8ed with this meaning, 80 
tha t the idea is the aame a. the torm Which eomething 
im1tate •• 14 
Thi. conc.pt ot llken.ss which ia includ.d in the ex-
~mplar.1 caus. is a formal lik.n •• a, ju.t a. the d.t.rmination 
~t thi. likenes. which the exemplar .xpre.... 1. a formal deter-
~ination. For 1n 80 far a. the practical intellect oaUses things 
~t i8 la1d to measure them. IS And that which can most tru~ be 
14 ~ !!£., q.3, a.l. 
15 "Intell.ctl18 enim practicus causat ree, wade .at mID-
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• called a measure i8 the form, which deter~De. the being to a 
definite .r&d. of beiDa. And thus it is that a house i. deter-
mined by the plan of the architect, and words by the truth in 
the intellect. And all natural thinss are determined by the 
divine 1ntellecat which contains all creatures as the intellect 
of an artist contains the works of his art. 
The exemplar thus implies, as its main charaeteristic 
an extrinsic form which tormally determine. the likeness of the 
ettect to it.elf. This means thet torma-l causality is the 
characteristic causality ot the exemplar. As john of st. Thomas 
so accurately put it: 
Nevertheless it must be said that the causality of 
the ideas can be reduced to e'tioient and tinal, but 
especially and properly to formal in 80 far as it is 
an extrinsic form fOrmine, but not infOrming. Thi8 
i8 the common opinion among Tbomi8ts.16 
And in this way the ca •• ali ty ot the exemplar is most character .. 
isticallTdetined as extrinsic tormal causality • 
• uratic rerum quae per ip.um fiunt.1t De Ver., q.l, &.2. 
--
16 John of St. Thomas, Cursu. ~11080Rb1cus, Lib. 2, 
q.11, a.3, Torino, 1933, 396. 
• 
GOD AS THE )(()lJBL OF ALL THINGS 
Bow there is but one God. And this God is absolutely 
simple, tor Be is absolutely tirst. God is the Firat Being, 
the caUse ot all other beings; and theretore there is nothing 
which can be prior to God. For it would be absurd to think 
that an ettect was prior to its cause. "But i,f God were composed 
in some way, there would be ,something which W'as prior to Him: 
namely, parts of which He was composed. Since, however, there 
can be nothinB prior to God, God ",st neoess.ri17 be sillPle.l 
To destroy God's simplicity would be to destroy God Himself. 
Thus, having admitted ther,e is a God, we have no other choice 
but steadtastlY to maintain Hi •• implicity. 
However we are immediately taced with the problem of 
explaining how a plurality ot idea. in the divine mind can be 
reconciled with God'. simplicity_ And the anawer which st. 
Thomas has given u. to this problem will brine us to the very 
core ot his doctrine ot exemplari... To beclnwith, St. Thoma. 
distincuishe. two tYJes ot ideas: one the.model of the thing 
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to 'be made. aD4 the other the 1ikene •• of the thbs known. x.t 
u8 examine thi. latter cl ••• ot id ••• tint. Heft the idea I. 
the repres.ntat1on of an o".1eot l?z. which tba.t o'bj.ot 1. knOWR. 
For it 18 oDly In 80 tar a. the likene ••• f an object informs 
our intel1eot that we are able to p .... 'beyond our.ely •• to that 
object. Thus each an 14e. IDtorm1nc our Intel1 •• t aauae. 1t to 
b. In aot.2 Bow if the miud of God .er, lato~.d 'by • plura11ty 
ot .ach 11k.ne ••••• 81. 81apliclty weald neoe.sarllY 'be d •• -
troyed. :ror In .0 tar .e He an dlyO''' object. He would be 
informed 'by • multi,llcity of 41Yer •• 14eae. Bat thl. 1. not 
the oa.. It .. e oo •• ldel' OOdto hay. Idea8 whioh are the medel. 
of thin... Sllch ld .... are 4eyl.ed b7 the al'tl.1o. ADd there-
tore they are no 10Dler iJ2!! U DiH .... th1Bg 1. bowa.. They' 
al'8 rather tha:~ whill! 1. no ... aDd b7 whioh the artlet i. ab1. 
to .oe.oap11.h hi8 work.3 A ,lura11tY of 8uch idea ... ollld 18 no 
way cOapJ'omiae 004' •• imp11clty. :ror w. are aot tr.rt.ac to .q 
2 It.oW' it CaD e •• l1y be .... how thi. 1. 80tJ'e,_,,1; 
to the 81apl101 ty of God. It w. ~oD.ld.r that \he 14e. of th_ 
thiq to be pod.ced 1. tn the "'.d of the proeluo_" .a that *1011 
1. unclen to od t and. not •• the lU ..... wh.re_ 11. ldl4erataa4.. . 
_hioh 1. a fon that aak •• a.e 1Iltel1.0' 1. 8.Ot,." 1.1~.It q.16 
,. 
that God 00\114 aet aderatan4 malO" thlqa. What we are .q1ng 1a 
that God'. uad.rataD41na oould not b. iDtor.me4 by a plurality ot 
diver •• lik.n....... 50w that Go4 UDde1".taDd • ..., thin •• 1a 
impli.d III the lmowl.dg. which Be halt of Hl.eU. )'01" 1n .0 tar 
a. Ged kilo •• the 41T1De ••• en,. pel'teetly. He lmew ...... 1'1' mod. in 
which It 1. kn .... a'bl.. But God t. • ••• no. can be kJUItWD Dot 0013 a. 
it 1. 1Jl It •• lt, bu.t alao a. 1t 1.Wta'ble 'by or.atures. Sinoe 
..... r" aaent produce. It. llke, every cr.atur. In e. tar •• It i. 
a or.at~re it in 80 .. w., l1ke the 4i ... ia ••••• nc.. Thus ae God lm... lii. • •• enoe •• lal ta.bl. by thi. orea tun t God kno.e It aa 
the .od.1 or Id •• of this oreat\1r •• 5 And in this manner God 
Dn. all thin.. other tllan Himaelt. 
If ... k.ep thi. In ah\d, w. are able to .e. h_ God Call 
UDder.tand many thinl .... lthoQt b.la. oomposed ot • plurality of 
lik.n.... ~or in the one simple aot by which God kno .... Rlmae1f. 
Go4 vader.tu4e all thina. other than Hi.elf. Thu. th.re 18 no 
real 41Yer81 ty 1n God. The diversit,. 1s rather ill the thln,. 
which are U11ders'ood by God. For all crea.tures, in eo tar .s 
~ !It., q.3. &.2. 
" "Bow, 1 t is not,. repugnant to the simplic1 ty ot the 
41 ... 1r1e ldadthat it underetlnd ..,. th1DC8, thoup lt wOll1d 'be 
repugaant to it. simplioity.ere Godts na4.ratandina to be in-
fOJtMd by .. plurality of likenea.ee." i. I., I. ct.ll, a.2. 
. . & • Inaaauoh ... God know. Hi. ... •••• DO. perfeotly, He leD..,. it according to e"ery mode In which lt Oall be _on. Now 
it Call b. known not 0817 .a it Is in'ltse1t, but .alt ftll 'b. 
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they are, imitate God. Ho'V'{ever no creature can imitate God per-
fectly, elnoe God 1. lnfinite. Baoh oreature then wlll imitate 
aoel ln its own particular manner, aince each individual creature 
1s dlstlnct from every other creature. And God, by knowing Him-
•• It a8 the mo4el ot all tbing., lmowe eTer,. creature in so tar 
.e lt approaches t. an 1m1tat10n of' Rim. Thus lt 1. that God, 
throupal t,. of Hl8ft1l BaiDl, 1e able t. W14eretand the 41ver-
ei U' ot tbtqe.' 
!he _a.l •• f thl. whole 11.e o~arlUB8nt 1. that the 
111yl.8 •••• a •• 1. the propel' aodel ot all thin... And this 
prell1.e 1. :aoat .erkinl" true .eTerthele •• lt 1 •• ot at all 
an ea.7 thillS to ••• how the 4ST.e ••••• c.t which 1. on •• 1apl. 
thi •• OaD b. the ,roper _4.1 of 41'9' ••• thin... . )lor 1n .0 tar 
•• lt ,. proper to one 1t would .... te b. un11ke the other •• ' 
partlcipat •• In b7 o~.atur •• acoordi., to some klnd of 11k.n •••• 
BlAt .TerT or •• tue hae ,t. "11 proper apeel... accordln. to whloh 
lt panS81pat •• 1 ..... w..,. ln the Uk •• e •• of the cll'1'1e ••••• noe. 
Thereto.... as GOd tao.. Hi. • ••• n.. .. e. 11111 table 'by .tach • 
or.atue. Be kD... .. t as the partlcular aod.l and ldea ot that 
oreatur •• aDd la like aanner •• r •• arcl. other or.at~ ••• " ll!!. 
6 8Dl ••• reo, qu.od De .. ,.1' tnt.lle.twa 0_1& o:perell., 
oDlllla acl .iIl111tw11nu •••• nti ••••• predueit. Ulld ••••• ntl • 
• lIa •• t 14 •• r.1'WIl' Doa quN, •• at ••• entia, .ed \it •• t latell.c-
ta. Bee aut .. oreatae ao. perf.8t. lm1 tantur dl'Ylnaa e •• enti .. ; 
~ •••••• tl& non aool,ltur a'b •• lute ab tat.I1eetu 41TlaO tat 
14.. ...... .e4 o~ proportiODe creataraa fieud.a ad 1, ... 41v-
,.,. ••••• tl .. , ... \tDdwa quocl cl1fle!t ab ea, Tel lm1tattar e .... " 
It- IIl-, q.3. a.2. 
, D1 •• r •• thiDa. m87, .r oaur •• , haTe .... thia. ia 
.0IlllOD. )'01' tutu •• , a an aacl .. u. haTe thle 1n co:mmol'l: 
they are Nth &D1_1.. n.e 11othl .. prohibita them froll haTlnc 
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This difficulty is not easy to overcome. But the more ptrfectly 
we realize how God 1s the proper model of all things. the more 
perfectly will we rea11ze the truth of exemplarism. Therefore 
let us try to clarify the manner in which God is the proper 
model of all things. 
The distinction of diverse things arises from their 
proper torms. 8 We may lain an insight into our problem then by 
realizing what Aristotle meant when he said forms were like 
nwnbers.9 Form. an.d numbers agree in t1l1a: it one unit is add-
ed or subtracted from either. the epecies is ohanled. And juet 
aa two plus or minus one d1tfers specifically. .0 does a sensi-
ble substance p'.s or minuII.:rational. With respect to the high-
er numbers and forms. intellect and nature can act 1n d1fferant 
ways. For the nature of a thine doee not allow the separation 
one common likeness. But it w0111d seem to be impossible for 
them to have one proper likene.s. For a man and an ass are two 
distinct things. and since they are. there must be something 
whichdistinguiahes them. That which dist1Dg111sbee them is their 
proper form. The proper form of a man is specifically d1fferent 
from the proper form of aD aaa. Therefore, since likeaeas 111 a 
similarity 1n form. the proper llkene.a of a man would be differ-
ent from. and in some way unlike (d1a.'mile),the proper 11keness 
of an aa.. For this reason, we ask the quest10n: How 1. it 
po.sible that God. Who i. one slmple beina. can be the proper 
likenea. of d1verse thinga? 
8 H ••• dlversarum rerum sit diatinctio ratione propr1-
arWll formar\Ull ••• " Q.2!ll. Gent., Lib. I, cap_ 54. 
9 uetaph., VIII 3, (1043b 35). 
~, 
of thoa. thinss which are essential to it. Indeed if eomethtns 
es •• ntial Ie ~"'Y.d, the yer,y nature of the th1n, 1s ohanlad. 
Thus there DO longer is aD animal 1f the 8ensible soul is re-
moved from the 00.7_ HoweTer the intellect oan consider .eparate· 
lY thoae thtngs which are eS8entially united in the thing. Thus 
ln the number five the intelleot may consider three alone, or 1D 
a rational &IliMl only that which 1s aenslble. Theretore the 
IDtellect 18 able t. consid.er in the more complex foras the pro. 
per notions of the inferior torme, just as 1t CaD consid.er in 
te. the proper notions of all the lesser number. contained 
therein.10 
GOd, eince He 1. absolutelY perfect, eontaifis the per-
tectlon" of all things, net howeYer by way of cOapoS't1011, but 
.imp17. .And torm, ln .0 tar .e 1t le. 1. a. pert •• tl.lt. .or 
, ••• 1t inolude impertectioa exoept 1n 80 tar as it f~118 ahort 
ot true being. 
Theretore the 4iyin_ lat.lleot 1s able to oo.,~.h.nd 
in Hi8 •••• no. that whloh 1. proper to eaoh thlq by' 
t.mdereiaDd1nl 1n what way a thiDe 1m tat •• Hi •••• ence, 
... 4 :I.D _bat way it talle .hort Cdetlo1t:J of Hi •••• enee, 
tor la.tanoe, by UDderetaadia, HI ••••• no. a. 1.stabl. 
by the .ode of Ilte and not of tnowled •• , Be attain. 
the pro,.r tora .'1 plantl or apia ... Wtabl. by the 
mode of kDow1e48e aDd Dot ot lntelleot, He attain8 the 
proper lION ot al11mal; and thtle 1 t 1. w:1 th all other 
forme. 
10 ooat. aent., Lib. It Gap. 5'. 
11 IDle!. 
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Thus it is clear that God, since He is supremely per~eot: can be 
the proper model of all things, not indeed by Hia nature, but by 
Hi s knowledge. 
We may conoeiTe God.s the diTine plentitude, the sup-
erabundant source of all per~eotion, ~rom,thom issues the perfec-
tions ot all thinga. Ine:xha.aatible in Himselt, those things 
which imitate Him are necessarily many aDd 'I:1Terae. And one will 
be more perfect than another in so far as it more perfectly imi-
tates God Himeelt. Here we are able to ... ee the foundations of 
st. Thoma •• famed doctrine of the hierarchy of being. st. Thomas 
has often insisted that minerala are more perfect than elements, 
and plants than minerals, and animals than' plants, and man than 
all other animals. 12 Nature is ordered aocording to the Tariotls 
imitations of God from the lowliest likeneas ot the material 
elements to the very 1mace of God suoh as exists 1n man. The 
elements and mised bodies 1mitate God most fundamentally in that 
they exist. All el •• share. not only in exi.tence bat 11fe. 
Lastly animal. are perfeoted by knowledge and man by understand. 
inc.13 
12 "Hence 1n natural things speoie. seem to be arranc-
ed 1n a Iderarohy: as the mixed things are more perteot than the 
elements, and plants than minerals, and animale than plants, and 
men than other animals. and in eaoh ot thea. one species 1s more 
perfect than others." I-!-, I, q.4', a.2. 
13 "Hence, some th1ns- are like God first and most com-
monly beoause they exist; .eo ondly , because they l1Te; and 
thirdly beoaus. they know or understand." S.T., I, q.93, a.2; 
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We are able to distin,uish two mode in which cpeatures 
are like God. They have a likeness first to the divine knowledge 
and thence to the 4ivine nature itself. Through the knowled,e 
God has of Hl .. e1t, God understands the models of all posslble 
things. These model. themeelves are dlstinot in so far .s they 
mirror the divine nature in distinct Wa7S. Constituted according 
to their proper models thlnss then become the llving expressions 
of the.e models. And sinoe the.e medels in themeelves are but 
the expressions of the modes in which the divine nature is lm1t-
.. ~./' 
able, thin .. are 11keness.s of .Uhe divine nature itself. ADd 
therefore st. Thomas .,ys when .peaking of the image of God in 
man: 
••• every oreature is an lmase of the exemplary 11ke-
ness it hae in the divine mnd. We are not, however, 
usina the word imale in this sense, but as it implies 
a likeness in natl1re, that·is, inasmt1ch as all things, 
as beings, are llke to the First Being: as living 
beinas, 11ke to theFirstL1fe; and as lntel1igib1e 
belnas, 11ke to the Supreme Wisdom. 14 
Thls 11keness to the nature of God ls lntrinsio to all 
things, and that which is most real in them. However the like 
ness cannot be one of equality, for the infinite cannot be re-
produced. There is in the oase of man's reproduotion of man a 
likeness in species. .an in this case m&7 be oal1ed a univocal 
cf. Sparks, R! Divisione Causae Exemplaris, 50 & 51. 
'0 
.. 
oau.a8. But Gpd 1. a llon-uni ... ocal cau •• traneeen4illS all genera 
and epee lee ao tbat Hia ettect. 11&7. attain a 11kenea. to H1Dl on 
b7 w..., of ualol7. st. Tho .. expre •• e. the di.tance of this 
11kene.. ~ the • ...,1. ot the .UD. !he thias .ener~t.d by the 
aWl'. power a'ttain a likeDe.a of the aun, not 1n4 •• 4. a .pecltic 
11kenea. to the aun, but onlF a .en.rlc 11k.n.... Such a 11k.-
nea. 1. in 1teeU ... el7 di.tant. But the liken ••• of Otteatare to 
Go4 1. e ... en more 41etant .1uo. th.re ie no .enerl0 11ken ••• but 
onlF an analo,.ue oD •• 15 
Slnoe e ... ery oreature talla ahort ot. pertect 11ken ••• 
to 004, the 41 ... 1n. wl11 remal ...... ntially tr •• with re.pect 
to all or.ature.. In lt8.1t lnfinlte the dl ... 1ne wl11 can only 
be •••• ealtat.d by an lnflnit. object. God must ne ••• sarlly 
wll1 Hi ... lt, but ln eo dol81 He r.malna t'l' •• wlth re.peo't to 
all .1 ••• 16 BOw .... er th1Dce .~lat OD~ becan •• Gcd tr •• ly wl1la 
15 "Thereto:re it the,.s le an .. ent Dot contalned ln 
aQY .enue, lta etfect. wlll 8tl11 more di.tantly reproduce the 
tora .t the ... at. Dot. that ie, 80 .e to participat. in the 
llk.n.e. of the a,.nt'. torm accordiD, to the aa ... p.01fl0 or 
Ie rut I' 1. fermall V. bllt only acoordlna to 80-. eort ot analol7l 
ae _aiac itealf 1. common to all. In thiaway all oreat.d 
thiD,.. •• tar •• th.y are beiDea. are 11k. GOd aa the firat and 
aal •• r.al princlple of ~11 beiaa.- §. 1., I. q.4. &.3. 
16 ..... creatur& nOD pro.edlt a voluatate cliTlna 
naturalSter .aqu. ex •• oe.altate; 110et enim De~ •• ua Toluatate 
•• tu.ral!'er .t ex •••••• 1tat. aDl6t eu.m. bonitate •••• aOD tam.D 
a.t\U"allt.r allt ex D.e •• eltat. ",q.lt,ore&turaa producl, •• d 11:'&t-
1.. .0. eaia ore.turaa BUDt ~tlmaatln18 voluntatS_ dlyinae, 
pactll. ab .t. d.pa_e' bonit.s Dei. qlll e.t ultl •• tlDl •• cum as 
oreaturi. 41.lnae boaltatl nlhil acor.scat ••• • De ~ot •• q.l0. 
a.2 ad 6. --
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th_ 1;0 be.1' !hue J".t .. they 4.pel14 UpOD the knowledge of 
God tor what tlle7 are, tbey clepen4 "pon ,the will of Ged tor the 
t ... t that theY' &ft. ADd thi. i8 the pr1me ,.rteotioa of the 
oreature. that 1t be. YOI' it 1. onlY throuah ealstia. that the 
oreat~e .an .. ttain ,erreottoa. God b •• t .. e tbi. perteotion 
upon oreate •• by ... aot ot Hi. w111. And thu He. --r be eald 
to lov8 t:bat whioh Be oreat... hI' ·10"'. 1a the tlrat MT_nt 
of the w111 ad of e",.ry &1»»8t1t1 •• ,....1' .• 18 It .. -.rYololl. 1.t 
..,.. 
1. that 004 .\It .fBi. 100dDO ••• ou1d ha",. 10 •• 4 auoh low~ 
thlq.. lad.ed 81nee 1t 1a aD _b •• lutol7' tr •• act W. OaD •• 17 
oonoel",. 1t .. true atter the taot. 
-
1" s. f •• I,' q.19 ••• 4. 
18 I. 1-, I. q.20, a~l. 
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OHAPTER V 
DIVHre PROVIDENCE AND HlT.M:AN KNOWLEDGE 
The doctrine of exemplart.m i. of creat importance in 
the philosophy of st. Thoma.. Once having formulated thi. doc-
trine, st. Thomas could not proceed a. it he had never .entioned 
it. He had to show the relationship which existed between exemp-
laris. and the other doctrine. of his philoaopbT. However it 
would be impo •• ible for us to con.ider all the prob1e.. that are 
rai.ed in this w.,. Therefore in order to limit our inquiry I 
have chosen two proble .. which I consider of prime importance: 
those of divine providence and human knowledge. It is not ., 
intention, however, to become involved in the.e problema a. such, 
but only to clarify their relation to the d~rlne of exemp1ar-
lam. ADd I contend that both ot the.. Thomistic doctrine. find 
their ultimate foundation in the doctrine of exemplari ••• 
God i. the first Being Who po •• eaaea the full perfec-
tion of all bein,. simply. It is out of the abundance of His 
perfection and the infinity of Hi. goodness that He ba. choeen to 
create all that exiats. In this creation He is aided by nothing, 
neither a pre-existing matter upon which He worke, nor intermed-
iate agenta throUSh which He work.. He has, however. made all 
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things acoording to His knowledge and will. By His knowl~dge He 
~omprehends everything: Himself firstl and through Hirr.self all 
~ther things. And He knows things other than Himself not only in 
~ general way but even acoording to their individual being. For 
pod knows not only that which i8 common to things but also the 
~rinciple of their individuation, 1.e. matter. But even Buch an 
~xhaustive knowledge as this will not be followed by an effect 
~nless it be united to a deeree of the will. It is because ot 
~is goodness and according to His knowledge that God wills all 
~at He does will. All thin,s are totally subject to the divine 
"ill, because it is by the decree of the divine will that they 
~re made S! nihilo. Hence it can be said that God governs all 
~he things made by Him, tor we are said to govern those thinss 
~hich are subject to our will. 
Therefore it is necessary that God, Who in Himselt 1s 
perfect in eyery way. and by Hi. power gl"ant8 exist-
ence to all beings, 1s the Ruler Of all beings, Him-
selt ruled by none: nor is there any thins which is 
exe~t.ed trom His ruling, as neither there i8 any thins 
which does not owe ita existenoe to Him. Theretore 
as He is perteot in beina and causing , 80 is He per-
fect in ruling.2 
Thus we find that the fact ot creation forms the basis 
1 This is a priority of nature and not of time. 
2 Oon!- Gent., Lib. III, cap_ 1. 
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of providence.3 For when we come to realize the meaning·o! crea~ 
t~on, we gras. the radioal dependence and contingency of creatur-
es on their Creator. All that the creature ha., it haa received 
trom God., Ita form and operations, its goodne •• and order, and 
even its individuating difterences are all dependent upon the 
Creator., The order of thing is no les. aependent upon God than 
anything else., But we know that to order a thing is to govern i~ 
Thu. God, Who is the supre .. cause of things, is their supreme 
Ruler. He has not on13' glven the. theit 'beine, but in their 'be-
ing He has given the rule of their being. Individuals are not 
governed 'by this rule as by so.e general law. For in making in-
dividuals directlY, God will gOTern the. directly. It we have 
grasped the meaning ot creatien fullY, we oan appreciate the 
truth of the formula that to create ie to govern. 
Howe.er, while the divine Bovernment, or providence, is 
'based upon the creative act, the divine knowledge, as we have 
seen, i. at the root of Godts creative action. For it is neces-
sary that God's knowledge extends a8 far as His causality, and, 
in a certain sense, His knowledge i. even pre.upposed to His 
3 cf. Gilson, !he Spirit At Media •• al PbiJQso~, ch. 
a, Gilson here bringe out the fundamental character of creation 
in the doctrine,of "Christian Providenoe." Be even loee sO,tar 
as to e~ that "it is not in the leaet necessary to introduce 
any' new pr,inciple. here" in order to explain providence (155). 
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oall ... llty.' 81aoe GOd'" knowle4,e .... WIlCt •• "ch .. baa10 .poslt.loD 
in re1at1oato p~.T14.nce. st. Tho ... OaD .1 ... e what 1 .hall oal1 
an .. eaplatJ "eflaltte. of proTidence. God baa .1Ten oreattlre. 
ali th&'t the,. haTe. not onlT their beiD, but aleo tbe1r Order. 
BoW God ,. the caue. of thlq. by Hie '''''lleot • ...4 
thft,t.re 1t , ... oe"~rJ ~t the ~~ of ITer" 
.tte.t *01&14 , .... ed.t 111 aia ••• Hebe.,' the e."'1&r 
.t the order of thinl' t .... rd. thelr end .at aeoe.-
aari. pa'8-esl.t ln thtJ 41vlae aind J and th. .eap1ar 
ot thiDaa ........... tnaria aD eu 'a, properly .,.&klna. 
proT14eDoe.1 
. . . 
"e Oall •• e ... t st. Thoma. had 1. mind whe. he ... 14 that to rule 
and sovern by proT14enoe 1. "re17 to moTe thl,,1 to thelr end 
by the 1nt81180t.6 Thu. '1'0.14 .. 08 0*-11 extend onlJ •• tar aa ~ 
kDewledge 01 the 1ntellect extende. 
'lb,re 1.~ th.retor.~ a platt of d1TiIle pro ... 14 •• e oon .... 
latins inth. ,axem:plUy 14 ... of the order which thiDae haTe. The 
t .. ct that auoh a plall 1. put lnto .ttect i.e eat1rel,J' 4 epend ent 
UPOD the 41 ... 111 • .,,111. But Ruppe.1ng that 1 t 1. put lat. .tteot .. 
4: c, t. !._ I.. 1. Q_,14. a..8' ~4. "ont!,. Bere St .. 1'hemal 
4.1IOt •• tJuJ AIaIu'll11aD t01"81& that G ..•.••• net DOW thillll 
"' •• au.. the,. ue, 'but thiqa de _e.a""8 Qed :laafttl tlMa. TIlue w. 
ean o.ao,l., Go4 t a lmeWl,4., .. 10,io.117 ,1'1.'" t. 111. e.ua11t,._ 
God 1. an lnt,ilia_t acent Who •• :a_laqe 1. po.uppoee, '0 
JUa ... tiOl1 a. that Bi. Imowl"e 1 ... oon41 tl ••• f Hi •• 0'1 ••• 
Go4'. aot10a, h.e'f'er.. oarm.ot be thou.Pt ot ... , the ••• d.! tl0. of 
Sa b .... l.q •• ' .. Go4 ... u14 atl11 lo1e .. all thiIl,. "oalt Be 
bad mado none of them. 
51_ 1-,. I, q.22 .... 1 .. 
6 CODt. aerat •• Lib. lII~ cap. 64, AD1&. !IHU!S m-
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the direction which the order will te.ke 18 de'Pendent upon the 
exemplar.y Idea. It 18 the exe:mp1a17 idea which tntorms the will 
and direct. its action to some determinate etteet. In such a 
doetr1lle theM 1. 1'10 room tor the .,.olwttarlat a ••• rtios t that the 
only reason .. by thtaga are a. they are 1. "eoaue •• f the d.iv!n • 
.. 111. God oannot make mountains w1 thout "alleY'e.' :retr thi8 
.. o"ld ... tridtct the Da~re et mountaina, and theretor. ooatra ... 
410t the very iateDtioll of God. h.t .. a the win 1 ••••••• ..,,117 
relatM to the pte11 •• t, the ez •• utio.--.t pr • .,.14eraOe Ie De ••• -
.arl~ relat.4 to the examplar,y 14eaa. 
Therele 7et aDothe~ problem .. lth which .. e ... t 4e.,. 
the ,lroblem crt hraan lmowleqe in relation to the 41Ti ••• em-
plaJo.. And thi. probl.m '8 .f pe.t iDtpOrtancel tor ln 4e .. ll111 
.. lth It ... will 41800ver the firat principl •• at st. thomas' .ple. 
t .. 10fU. Therefore l.~ ~ 8&7 t lrat that It 1a .. ooOrdla, to the 
div1Jae _eaplara tbat th1ap are aai4 to be true. hr .. th1ac 
1. vue In .0 fu .a It eoft •• ,.., to lt8 lelea III the latel1 •• ' 
on1fhloh It 481'en41. 8 !hu.. It.e an to know the truth .t any-
'1 -.\Ooor4_17 & •• 1'014 aftol' I, retute •••• ),lrlt, 
there 1& the error of those who maintain that all th1qe are the 
x-e.lll.t .f God'. ab •• late .. 111"lthollt ...,. plaD. 'thl. 11 tha 
eJ'"!" of the ... l.a theolo,l •••••• 0001"4188 t. wh •• the -11' 
.... 0 ... _ tlrohe.t8l'&ther than ohlll, 1a b ••• u. God· •• "tlll!.-
ifal. ilIi., Lib. III. oap. ". 
e· ••• ~l'7th1ns 18 _14 t. be true a'D.ol.telT. la •• 
tar a. It 10 l'olate4 t. the lDtel1 •• , o. which it 4","a, aDd 
thu 1 t 1. tl:la t artlf1cia1 thiD.. ue .a14 to 'be trll. aa _01na 
relate4 to our latolle.t ••• In the __ .. ..., Datural thlDao are 
4'7 
• 
thing, our intellect mast contain 80me 11kenes. of the divine 
trt.lth. 
Acoordlqly, just a8 the .oul and other things are sald 
to be true in their na.ture acoordiol aa they are liken-
ed to that 8upreme natura, whioh 18 truth itse1t, since 
it 1. ita 'own understood bel .. , so too, that which is 
known by tha 80\1118 true ao far.. it oontains a like ... 
•••• to that 41 ... 111 a tru.th which God knows. 9 
lleJUl'. tl1edl ... 1Ileue.,lara u. the ult1ma.tecrlterlon of truth; 
aD4 De •• a''talll 'e .... 'rath', we ua 8aid to DOW it in the 
4iYl •••• Japlua,.10 ,/ 
Btl, •• t , ••• st. tho .. _ab when he • .,.. that .... know 
all \hi .. _,. the 41 ..... _eaplUa'" lie 40 •• not_all that we 
lm .. tll •• seaplar 111 It.elf aa4',thre-ah the aemplal', the tIline • 
.. hie. 1altate It. :r01" thie Im .... l .... he re.ene. for the 
1t1e ••• ct, who •• a Goel ·tace '0 taoe'." ft.. 1., howfITar, a •• 0-
01'.14 .. ., 111 Whieh eee thiD' 1. m.w .. la _other, 1.e. a. in a 
,riDeipl. ot kIlowl_p,jll.' aa 1. the _ •• "bloh i. a priDc1p1. 
ot .1,ht. " .... &11 that " ••••• 11 AD4 1D thl. W&J" •• are .&14 
to Jmn all tbJap III tbe ell",ill. ae.,lazo& ae 1a a pr11101pl. of 
.a14 to be tz"~ 1n eo tar .. the.r expre.. the liken... ot the 
epeol •• ill the 41",1._.64 .. - I_ I.; I, q.16, a.l. 
t Oont. Geat.,l4b. III. oap_ 4'7. -It 1& aoooZ"dlasto th... .ze.,lara that all thi.,. azoe forae4 a •• ell .s tbat the 
hu .... O~ ~". allthlDl •• - 1-1-. I, q.84, a.5. 
10 wADel til. we .et ....... .,. that the h .... eOlll 
knowe all tb1.,. 1n the 4ivl.& ... .,l&zo •••• • I-I., I. q.84, a.5. 
11 It... ODe thiDa 1. sa14 to be lm.... 111 aDother ill tw 
".,... 71rst, .. 111 aD object It •• lt DO'II1lI •• ODe.,. ••• 111 & 
knowl ...... 
And ta. w. .at n •• de .&7 th .. t. thAt hw.u .oul knowa 
all thlaCl 111 tu .temal IlDJIlplara,ainoe 'by' partic!-
patioa;1atb ••• exemplar. we·kDow all t£1na8. YOI' the 
1s'el1e.t .. l I1cbt lta.lt, whi.h 1. In u., 1. aothine 
el.. tl'JaD a p&rtloi.])ate4 1Ikene.. ot the Wlere.te4 
11lht, In whiGh are contained tbe .ternal 8xemplar.12 
Aal ea14 betore, 1ft erder to know truth. ·our lntel. 
i \ 
le.t .at o •• tal .... lUr •• o ••• f tho 41'9'loe truth,· ADd .... 4 • 
• ontal •• 11k.e •• to the 4inn. truth 1n the blte.lle"t"a1 11cht, 
or the •••• t intelleot, W'h1oh w. ha.., ••. ~. 1.te11 •• 'ua1 I1p. 
, 
1 ... lD4i.,. ••• b1. p1"op.r~ or all latel11 ••• t b.l.... BoweTer 
"he .... , 1atell0.t alonoi. DO' .ufticiont tor Imowled •• 11l _. 
JfaIl l~·"lD the 1»047· aIld .et, attalll·la1cnrl.4g.· thz'oup the bo47. 
Theretor. the Dec ••• l" of the latell1.1bl. apeolee, whloh are 
abePaet.d tna tld ••• t oamaot 'b. "er1.okeel. 
Bat b •• 14 •• the lnt.llectual ltCh' ... hlch 18 1n " •• 
intellialbl. epecl ..... hioh ...... r'.e4 fro. th1r1"., 
are r.qu1r.d ill order that .... "'~'9'e kDowled •• of 
.. terial thUe.. th.r.ton thi. btllHSo 1. not 4ue 
.. "~ to • pan1el,.tl0 • • t tho etornal ex •• plan. as 
the Platonlat. h.ld, aalatalataa that the .... partlei. 
pati •• In the 14ea .attle", tor .wl.4.e.13 
1111"1"01' the ........ of the thiap rofleoted t_reln. In thla wt:I 
tho .ou~. 1D the F •••• t .tat. of 1dte, .... not ••• all th1a,. 1a 
the .'.rDa1 •• _lara. btlt' 'hu. the 1tl ••• ed. ...ho ••• G04 aDd all 
thin,. 1a mDl,. know all tMaca t.a the eternal esemplar.. Se.oracl-
17, one th1D., i. .a14 to b. Jm.e1ftl 1a aIlother a. ln a prinelpl. Of 
knowl.,,,., aI14 thb w. alpt .., tIlat w •••• In the .Wl what w • 




Th.re 1. ,..t dother W&7 1n "hlch .e _,. be 8ald to 
contain a.likene8 •• f the 4i.ilie truth. 1n our p08 •••• 10n .t the 
tir.t prlDc1ple. of lato"led ••• l • This 1. also aD indi.pen.able 
element otkDowl.4,.. Wlth.~t thi. 11k.ne •• to the 41Tln. truth 
DO knowledge'. po •• lble. the flrat prlacl»l.a ot lata-leds. are 
jut a. much a property ot all lDtellieent beiD •• as the acent 
intelle.t. lD..o tar aa •• ••• all thi,.. in the 11.ht otth ••• 
priaolpl.. aD4 judae all thiD.. aooordl88 to tbe., we are said 
" 
}to •• e an4 j ud.. all thiq8 acoordiq to the diTlne exemplars • 
••• ,.et 8 ••• trtlth. there are in wb1eh all men acre., 
suoh a. the fir.t principles both ot the a,eculatiTe 
aDel ot the practleal iatell •• t, lDas.uoh aa .. kind ot 
l ... e ot the diTiDe trQ~ 1s refl •• ted in the mind. ot 
all _D. 00.a.quent17, when a mincl kDowa "ith certitude 
&qthtaa at all, and b7 traoine 1t baok to the princl-
pl.a b7 whieh"e jud.e ot ••• r7thll1., co ... to ••• lt in 
tho.e priD01pl.a, it ia aald to a •• all 8ueh thines in 
the diTin. truth or in the eternal ld.aa, and to jud.e 
ot all thlnss aooorell.. to th ... 15 
Th. relation of the 4iTi •• exemplars to h ..... knowl.dge 
Oall be sWlllDarl.e4 in thi. way. Fir.t, the diT1I1 •• x.lI1J)lars fon 
the ult1mate baais of truth and certitude. Secoad, 18 DO waT 40 
we know the 4iT1a. ex.ap1ars in th .... 1T... Third,,,. attaill the 
diTiae exe.plar. oalT 1a a .. 4iat. maDDer and la a cau •• 4 11ke-
14 ft ••• tiret principle., the knowle4 •• of whioh i. 
innate (~ IriB.1f1a guolGa cocnitio !!! aobi, ~anatl) are 
certain IIiii ••• oth. UDcreated truth." De lit., q. 10, a. 6, 
a4 6. 
15 Qont. !!!!!!., Lib. III, .ap. ". 
GO 
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ne.a, finite aDd lmpre •• ed OD our intellect. 
w. ha.. oeneidered exe.plari •• in the phllosoph7 ot 
at. Tho.s AquiDas. There can be no doubt ot the importance of 
this doctrine in hi. philosophT. It aasume. a basic posltlon ln 
hi. metaplv'aies, natural theology, aDd epiatemolosy. let no one 
who calla h1 .. elt a Thomiat forget to take account ot this 
doctrine. 
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